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Becky L. Jacobs *
In her article, “Beyond Bitcoin: Leveraging Blockchain to Benefit Business
and Society” Professor Weldon explores the potential of blockchain
technology to transform corporate governance and risk management and
to promote the principles of transparency that animate various mandatory
disclosure regimes.1
I too am very excited by blockchain’s potential to revolutionize and
make more transparent many business practices, but I also have some, pun
intended, crypto-concerns. I admit that these concerns are based upon
* Waller Lansden Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Email: jacobs@utk.edu. I want to acknowledge my wonderful colleagues, Joan Heminway
and George Kuney, who have a talent for organizing thought-provoking symposia and who
allow me to participate, and to William A. Beasley and Adelina S. Keenan, the Transactions:
The Tennessee Journal of Business Law editors who had to contend with dramatic weather and
professionals to make the event possible and enjoyable. Thanks also to all of the Business
Law Prof Bloggers who attended and stimulated the intellect, particularly Marcia Narine
Weldon, whose presentations and scholarship are always enlightening, entertaining and
inspiring.
1 Marcia Weldon, Beyond Bitcoin: Leveraging Blockchain to Benefit Business and Society, 20 TENN.
J. BUS. L. 837 (2019). Professor Weldon’s comments focus on consortium (permissioned)
and private distributed ledger technologies (“DLTs”); my thoughts will be more
applicable to public (permission-less) DLTs. These terms refer to the three operating
blockchain platforms: (1) public, permission-less; (2) consortium, permissioned, and (3)
private. Anyone can participate in a public DLT through the consensus process, i.e.,
Ethereum. Access to consortium, permissioned blockchains is limited by the determined
multiple organizations that manage it, as is true with a private blockchain that is managed
by one organization with full control. See Nabil El Ioini & Claus Pahl, A Review of
Distributed Ledger Technologies, OTM CONFEDERATED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES,
ON THE MOVE TO MEANINGFUL INTERNET SYSTEMS (Springer, Cham, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/yacp7bh9. Some contend that “private” blockchains really are
repackaged shared databases as the blockchain’s defining innovation was its proof-ofwork consensus mechanism. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan, “Private blockchain” is Just a
Confusing Name for a Shared Database, Freedom to Tinker (Nov. 2018), https://freedomto-tinker.com/2015/09/18/private-blockchain-is-just-a-confusing-name-for-a-shareddatabase/.
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my natural skepticism for anything that is alleged to be foolproof. They
also, however, are based upon our very real experience with the internet,
which makes it clear that we need to make certain that the technology is
truly ready to adequately and securely execute the tasks that we are being
told it can accomplish and that there is a legal framework in place to
manage the inevitable disputes that arise from its use. Anyone who has
had their email hacked or has been impacted by identity theft through a
database breach should be similarly cautious.
Blockchain technology interacts with the law in a number of
contexts, corporate governance being one (as well as copyright and other
IP, tax, antitrust, securities regulation, banking, criminal, corporate,
maritime, insurance, and on and on), and it raises questions about the very
nature of what blockchain technology can represent, such as Bitcoin,
zencash, Ether, or other cryptocurrencies or currency-related products.
Are these currencies “property” as traditionally conceptualized?2 Are they
legally-defined securities, as another article in this symposium explores?
Scholars, lawyers, and policy makers are grappling very publicly with these
questions alongside IT professionals. This intense interest is obvious; if
you search Google with the term “Blockchain” returns “About
219,000,000 results (0.39 seconds)[.]” There also are hundreds of scholarly
articles that discuss blockchain questions on research networks.
I will focus on just a few concerns. The first is on the “smart
contracting” aspect of blockchain technology, and the second pertains to
its current negative environmental impact. My concluding remarks will
touch upon the concept of “transparency” in the promotion of
blockchain technology in the legal context.

Just FYI: In the U.S., cryptocurrency is treated as property for federal tax purposes.
Internal Revenue Service, IRS Virutal Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency is Treated as
Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions Apply, IR-201436 (Mar. 25, 2014). For a complete survey of global regulation of virtual currencies, see
U.S. LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER, REGULATION
OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD (June 2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/
help/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-world-survey.pdf.
2
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Smart Contracts:3
I want to frame my comments regarding smart contracts with
Lawrence Lessig’s pronouncement that “code is law.”4 His words were very
prescient in 1996:
[A regulator] in cyberspace need only change the code-the
software that defines the terms upon which the individual
gains access to the system, or uses assets on the system. If
she wants to limit trespass on a system, she need not rely
simply on a law against trespass; she can implement a
system of passwords. . . . [T]here is a code (as in software)
to assure what the code (as in law) demands. . . . Code is
an efficient means of regulation. . . . One obeys these laws
as code not because one should; one obeys these laws as
code because one can do nothing else. There is no choice
about whether to yield to the demand for a password; one
complies if one wants to enter the system. In the well
implemented system, there is no civil disobedience. Law as
code is a start to the perfect technology of justice.5
In 2006, he revisited the topic and found that “[c]ode can, and
increasingly will, displace law”6 and shifts “effective regulatory power
from law to code, from sovereigns to software.”7

3 This essay does not provide a legal analysis of the status of cryptocurrencies or their
initial offerings (“ICOs”). Also, for purposes of this article, I proceed on the assumption
that smart contract are “contracts” in a theoretical sense. Several commenters have raised
this issue: “Smart contracts are designed to eliminate the need for legal enforcement.
The central feature of a smart contract—what supposedly makes them smart—is that
legal enforcement will not be necessary or even possible. In a very real way, smart
contracts are not intended to be legally enforceable.” Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell,
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 339 (2017). Tangentially, others contend that the
term “‘smart contract’ is itself imperfect. A smart contract is neither smart, nor is it
necessarily a contract. A smart contract is computer code programmed to execute
transactions based on pre-defined conditions. . . . Because a smart contract is computer
code, a smart contract may represent all, part, or none of a valid legal contract. . . . Thus,
smart contracts are the programmatic means by which some or all of the terms of the
legal contract are performed.” Digital Chamber Of Commerce, “Smart Contracts” Legal
Primer - Why Smart Contracts Are Valid Under Existing Law And Do Not Require Additional
Authorization To Be Enforceable 1–2 (Jan. 2018).
4

Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 at 5 (2d ed. 2007).

5

Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996).

6

Lessig, supra note 4, at 175.

7

Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 206 (1999).
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Smart contracts are basically these cryptographic codes as law,
capable of facilitating, executing, and enforcing the negotiation or
performance of an agreement using blockchain technology. Because
they are designed and implemented within blockchains, they inherit some
of its properties, i.e., they are validated by and exist within the distributed
ledger system of the chain, and, as such, they are theoretically difficult
for an attacker, or one of the parties, to hack or alter in bad faith.
Nick Szabo, who some speculate may be the elusive creator of
bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, coined the term “smart contract.” This is
how he describes the concept in his original paper on the topic:
A canonical real-life example, which we might consider to
be the primitive ancestor of smart contracts, is the humble
vending machine. Within a limited amount of potential
loss (the amount in the till should be less than the cost of
breaching the mechanism), the machine takes in coins, and
via a simple mechanism, . . . dispense[s] change and
product according to the displayed price. The vending
machine is a contract with bearer: anybody with coins can
participate in an exchange with the vendor. The lockbox
and other security mechanisms protect the stored coins
and contents from attackers, sufficiently to allow
profitable deployment of vending machines in a wide
variety of areas.8
If anyone has lost money in a vending machine, I think you might
see where my technological concerns might be given Szabo’s simple
analogy. If the technology does not work, well, your options for cure are
limited in both instances: shaking, kicking, cursing.
I am not being overly captious or a doom-monger. As William L.
Fitts also will discuss, in 2016, a hacker “stole” $50 million from the
original Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO”) based on the
Ethereum blockchain.9 Another example: in November 2017, a bug in
Parity, an Ethereum wallet for cryptocurrency, resulted in more than $150

8 Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks (1997),
https://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469.
9 See QUINN DUPONT, EXPERIMENTS IN ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE: A HISTORY AND
ETHNOGRAPHY OF ‘THE DAO,’ A FAILED DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATION 7 (Routledge ed. 2017).
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million worth of Ether being permanently frozen.10 A careless developer
effectively destroyed a piece of Parity's code, rendering all of the wallets
that were created after that piece of code’s creation unusable.
Unfortunately, these two examples are not aberrations. A team of
computer scientists from University College London analyzed a sample of
nearly one million Ethereum smart contracts, flagging around 34,000 as
vulnerable—including the one that led to the Parity fund freeze, or lock.11
On a subset of 3,759 contracts that the team sampled for validation, it
reproduced real exploits on a whopping 89% (yielding exploits for 3,686
contracts).12
Interestingly, the lead investigator in that study compared the
team’s work to interacting with a vending machine, as though the
researchers randomly pushed buttons and recorded the conditions that
made the machine act in unintended ways.13 They found three primary
vulnerabilities in the smart contracts that they analyzed:14 (1) “Greedy”
contracts that locked funds indefinitely, (2) “Prodigal” contracts that
leaked funds carelessly to arbitrary users, or (3) “Suicidal” contracts that
could be “killed” by any arbitrary account.15 The team estimated that the
maximum amount of Ether that could have been withdrawn from leaking
and suicidal contracts was US$ 5.9 million.16 It further approximated that
US$ 7.5 million was locked in “dead” contracts on the blockchain, US$
379,940 million of which had been sent after these contracts had been
killed.17

Stan Schroeder, Wallet Bug Freezes More Than $150 Million Worth of Ethereum (Nov. 8,
2017) https://mashable.com/2017/11/08/ethereum-parity-bug/#Hxi0yPyJ_mqE.

10

IVICA NIKOLIC ET AL., FINDING THE GREEDY, PRODIGAL, AND SUICIDAL CONTRACTS
SCALE 1–2 (Mar. 14, 2018) abs/1802.06038 (2018), arXiv:1802.06038,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06038.
11

AT
12

Id. at 1, 2, 10.

13 Mike Orcutt, Ethereum’s Smart Contracts are Full of Holes, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW,
Mar. 2018, at 1–2, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610392/ethereums-smartcontracts-are-full-of-holes/.
14

NIKOLIC ET AL., supra note 11, at 2.

15

Id. at 3-4.

16

Id. at 13.

17

Id.
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This is not the only vulnerability to which blockchain smart
contract technology is subject. While the structure of a distributed ledger
is claimed to be virtually impossible to hack, the private keys required to
access a blockchain can easily be stolen. If a hacker gains entry to the
blockchain, they have access to the key holder’s account and can “view”18
all information on the ledger.
There is also the 51% attack problem. This can occur because an
attacker or a group controlling 51% of the computing power on the
network can interfere with the process of recording new blocks,
theoretically allowing the attacker or group to monopolize the mining of
new blocks.19 The attackers also can send a transaction, then reverse it,
making it appear as though they still possess the currency that they just
spent, a vulnerability known as double-spending, the digital equivalent of
counterfeiting.20 At one time a theoretical risk, these attacks are becoming
regular occurrences. At least five cryptocurrencies were hit with 51%
attacks over the summer, resulting in losses of the equivalent of nearly
$20 million dollars.21
These susceptibilities illustrate the technical vulnerabilities to
which smart contracts are subject, but there also are substantive and
structural concerns, such as how the lex cryptographia or cyber law

One might question the applicability of the use of the term “view,” a concept that I
will explore briefly in the conclusion to this essay.

18

See, e.g., Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve,
Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, 1 (2014). Some contend that the
threshold for such an attack is substantially lower than 50% and, due to the danger that
so-called selfish mining poses to the Bitcoin ecosystem, propose thresholds of no more
than 25-33%. See Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is
Vulnerable, 61 COMM. OF ACM 95, 102 (2018).

19

20

Id.

David Canellis, Cryptocurrency Hackers Earned $20 Million in 2018 with So-Called 51%
Attacks, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/
cryptocurrency-hackers-earned-20-million-with-51-percent-attacks-in-2018-201810?r=UK&IR=T. See also Alyssa Hertig, Blockchain’s Once-Feared 51% Attack Is Now
Becoming Regular, COINDESK (June 9, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchainsfeared-51-attack-now-becoming-regular/. There are other malicious bugs, such as one
found in the blockchain associated with the cryptocurrency “zcoin” that would allow
users to print unlimited zcoin. Rob Price, A Single Typo Let Hackers Steal $400,000 from a
Bitcoin Rival, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/typobitcoin-rival-zcoin-attacker-steals-400000-2017-2?r=UK.
21
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addresses smart contracts, if it does, and how these contracts interact with
off-line, or extranet, laws, particularly if disputes arise.
These are still very much unsettled questions, but technology
development has not paused in order to resolve them. Sites utilizing
distributed ledger technology have forged ahead with their own extralegal
systems existing entirely in the digital environment. For example,
OpenBazaar, an open source network much like eBay (but without the
fees), offers multi-signature escrow for cryptocurrency payments as well
as a “moderator” system to settle disputes.22 The moderators are selected
by the disputing parties in OpenBazaar’s open marketplace.23
Other decentralized crypto-“courts” are evolving, including
Kleros, a self-described “decision protocol for a multipurpose court
system [and an] Ethereum autonomous organization that works as a
decentralized third party to arbitrate disputes in every kind of contract,
from very simple to highly complex ones.” 24 Kleros is a fully-automated
arbitration process, the integrity of which is designed upon gametheoretical economic incentives.25 The Kleros platform has received even
mainstream attention,26 but there are other systems vying for the business
of resolving smart contract disputes, such as JUR27 and Sagewise.28 Indeed,
some providers of blockchain technologies such as the Aragon Network
are offering “to act as . . . digital jurisdiction[s],” essentially replacing
choice of law with choice of code and making national or transnational
law redundant. If blockchain technologies contain alternate, digital

List of features of Openbazaar, OPENBAZAAR, https://openbazaar.org/features/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2019).

22

23

Id.

Clement Lesaege & Federico Ast, Kleros—Short Paper v 1.0.6, KLEROS (Nov. 2018),
https://kleros.io/assets/whitepaper.pdf.

24

25

Id.

26 See, e.g., Jay Kim, In The Future Blockchain Will Solve Most Real-World Problems—Even
Arbitration, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimjay/
2018/04/04/in-the-future-blockchain-will-solve-most-real-world-problems-evenarbitration/#41f42461bd2f. Guidelines to govern the creation, performance, and
enforcement of smart contracts also are beginning to appear. JAMS, previously known
as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc., is among the “first institutional ADR
providers to create protocols supporting the use of ADR in disputes arising from
blockchain activities, including smart contracts.” Services implementing these services
surely will follow.
27

JUR, https://jur.io/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).

28

SAGEWISE, https://www.sagewise.io/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815967

918

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

mechanisms of contract enforcement, what, if any, are their jurisdictional
boundaries?
In the event a dispute exits a URL and enters the IRL, does any
law, and, if so, what law, applies? Consider, for example, a cross-border
blockchain dispute involving cryptocurrency. The original paper on smart
contracts in which Szabo sets forth his vision of a new contracting world
contained numerous vague statements about “common law.”
Over many centuries of cultural evolution has emerged
both the concept of contract and principles related to it,
encoded into common law. Such evolved structures are
often prohibitively costly to rederive. If we started from
scratch, using reason and experience, it could take many
centuries to redevelop sophisticated ideas like contract law
and property rights that make the modern market work.
But the digital revolution challenges us to develop new
institutions in a much shorter period of time. By
extracting from our current laws, procedures, and theories
those principles which remain applicable in cyberspace, we
can retain much of this deep tradition, and greatly shorten
the time needed to develop useful digital institutions.
Computers make possible the running of algorithms
heretofore prohibitively costly, and networks the quicker
transmission of larger and more sophisticated messages.
Furthermore, computer scientists and cryptographers
have recently discovered many new and quite interesting
algorithms. Combining these messages and algorithms
makes possible a wide variety of new protocols. These
protocols, running on public networks such as the
Internet, both challenge and enable us to formalize and
secure new kinds of relationships in this new
environment, just as contract law, business forms, and
accounting controls have long formalized and secured
business relationships in the paper-based world.29
If one presumes that some sort of IRL legal regime applies, there
is the possibility that the law of the algorithmic code may conflict with the
real-world law. The most obvious IRL case is the conviction of Ross W.
Ulbricht on charges of drug trafficking and other crimes related to his
29

Szabo, supra note 8.
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development and operation of the darknet illegal marketplace, the Silk
Road.30 Alternatively, those seeking to exploit blockchain vulnerabilities
may raise the “code-as-law” defense as did the DAO hacker who
“transferred” $50 million of Ether; the code defines legality.31
Even assuming legality, however, are parties even able to seek legal
enforcement in brick and mortar courts if such conflicts arise? For some,
the answer is an unqualified “yes.” To this group, “smart contracts” are
not necessarily contracts but rather are computer code programmed to
execute the terms of a legal contract, and, as such, traditional legal analysis
and existing laws are sufficient to respond to legal disputes arising from
these types of agreements, regardless of their form.32
Where do parties turn, however, if they do not agree with or
cannot find a favorable reception for that contention? Obviously, there
currently is little-to-no regulatory oversight of, or authority over,
blockchains. In fact, in blockchain transactions, as it is exceptionally
difficult to even identify the parties to the transactions, it would be difficult
to order enforcement extra-cryptographically.33
Some governments and standard-setting organizations are
beginning to address these issues. Internationally, the International
Standards Organization has established a technical committee, ISO/TC
307, to develop standards for blockchains in a number of key areas:
reference architecture, taxonomy and ontology, use cases, security and
privacy, identity and smart contracts.34

United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708
(2018); Cf. Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2580664.

30

See Dupont, supra note 9, at 10. See also Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability
of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1401 (2018).

31

32

See Digital Chamber of Commerce, supra note 3, at 1–2.

ANDREJ SAVIN, BLOCKCHAIN, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE LAW: WHAT CAN
WE LEARN FROM THE RECENT DEALS? 4 (2018), http://openarchive.cbs.dk/
bitstream/handle/10398/9648/Savin_Blochain.pdf ?sequence=1. A court order could,
perhaps, be enforced with a new transaction in a chain, but that is not possible without
an access key.

33

34ISO/TC 307: Blockchain and Electronic Distributed Ledger Technologies, INT’L ORG.
STANDARDS, https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html (2016).
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Regulatorily, there is significant interest in blockchain and smart
contract technology at all levels of government, but there does not appear
to be a formal, official regulatory response,35 perhaps because of the lack
of generally accepted standards in the still-emerging technology. There
are some notable exceptions. China, for example, has been very active
regarding blockchain governance,36 i.e., the Cyberspace Administration of
China has published draft rules to regulate blockchain projects.37 French
legislators also have introduced blockchain-specific legislation pertaining
to the use of blockchain for recording financial and other instruments and
for improving their ownership authentication.38 While other nations have
announced “sandboxes,” or legally-approved experiments with
blockchain, or plans to develop legislation, no other laws39 appear to have
been enacted, nor does there appear to be much interest in developing an
international convention or treaty on blockchain issues.
Focused more specifically on smart contracts, lawmakers in
Monaco recently approved a bill creating a legal foundation for smart
contracts, and several nations are engaged in activity pertaining to noncryptocurrency-related smart contracts.40 In the U.S., the action is at the
This excludes activity related to cryptocurrency. See generally, e.g., U.S. LAW LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 2.

35

China presents a fascinating political case vis-à-vis blockchain technology. As one
journalist wrote, “the Chinese government is seeking to “have its cake and eat it too”
when it comes to crypto assets and blockchain technology. The simple phrase
“blockchain not Bitcoin” has become the country’s defining strategy when it comes to
the space, and the difference in approaches that the government has taken regarding
closed v. open ledgers and assets is a study in contrast.” Steven Ehrlich, Making Sense Of
China's Grand Blockchain Strategy, FORBES, Sep 17, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevenehrlich/2018/09/17/making-sense-of-chinas-grand-blockchain-strategy/. China
“plans to aggressively invest in the development of fintech and blockchain technology
. . . [while at] the same time, the CPC has been overtly hostile to any and all activities
related to crypto assets[, banning] all ICOs in the country [and] blocking crypto-related
accounts.” Id.
36

37 Samuel Haig, News-China Seeks Public Feedback on Draft DLT Regulations, BITCOIN.COM
(Oct. 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/china-feedback-dlt-regulations/.
38 See Stéphane Blemus, Law and Blockchain: A Legal Perspective on Current Regulatory Trends
Worldwide, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER (CORP. FIN. & CAPITAL MKTS
L.R., RTDF N°4-2017) 11-12 (2017), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3080639.

Several U.S. states have passed blockchain-related legislation, including Nevada’s 2017
law that made it the first U.S. state to ban local governments from taxing blockchain use.
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 244.3535, 268.0979 (2017).

39

40

FLORIAN MÖSLEIN, CONFLICTS OF LAWS AND CODES: DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES
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state level. Tennessee, for example, passed legislation in 2018 recognizing
the legal authority to use blockchain technology and smart contracts for
electronic transactions.41 The legislation also includes a provision that
“protects ownership rights of certain information secured by blockchain
technology.”42 Arizona has similar legislation, enacted in 2017. 43
In Vermont, a law enacted in May 2018 allows blockchain-based
limited liability companies (“BBLLCs”) to use blockchain technology for
various aspects of corporate governance, including the use of smart
contracts to administer the BBLLC’s voting procedures.44 This raises
some very interesting questions about how well decentralized networks
with governance structures encoded in software architecture fit within
traditional legal schema for business associations.45
In addition to the uncertainty regarding their interaction with IRL
legal systems, smart contracts also suffer from a fact of contractual life:
ambiguity. Subjective contract determinants of quality, reasonableness,
best efforts, buyer satisfaction, timeliness, force majeure, etc. plague their
execution, too. Szabo’s original article concedes this fact, and I quote,
“[u]nlike most real-world contracts, protocols must be unambiguous and
complete.”46 He appears, though, to think that most contract terms can
be coded unambiguously, i.e., consider his rather offhand reference to the

OF DIGITAL J URISDICTIONS

8 (2018).

41

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-10-201, 47-10-202 (2018).

42

TENN. S.B.1662/H.B.1507 (Mar. 2018).

43

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1801, 44-7061 (2018).

44

See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4175, et seq. (2018).

45 While blockchain technologies are promoted as operating more democratically, there
are significant regulatory and operational risks for decentralized networks. Traditional
business associations are juristic personalities based upon legally mandated frameworks
to which the encoded governance structures of decentralized autonomous organization
with their multiple, geographically diverse, and anonymous stakeholders are not easily
adapted. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Carla L. Reyes, Nizam
Geslevich Packin, & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2017). Despite this challenge, several states have enacted or are considering
blockchain-related amendments to their corporate laws. Delaware, for example, amended
its corporate law to allow maintenance of a distributed ledger of records administered
by or on behalf of a corporation. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 224 (West 2017).
46

Szabo, supra note 8.
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possibility that smart contract reifications could “account for hardship and
operational exceptions.”47
However, if an oracle creates a block that invokes a smart contract
breach protocol for which the alleged breaching party has a valid excuse
or defense, but one for which the code does NOT account, the very
impregnability of a blockchain would appear to make it incredibly difficult
to respond to problematic challenge-response algorithms.48
Environmental Impact
I could go on for pages about this, but let me just briefly mention
my second concern, which is the environmental impact of blockchain
technology. Putting aside environmental compliance, energy peer-to-peer
microgrids, and the many other potential positive environmental issues
which blockchain might address, the technology also has an immediate
negative environmental impact as utilized by some applications.
The impact to which I refer is the energy intensity required by
Bitcoin and several other cryptocurrencies that utilize proof of work
mining processes to validate transactions.49 Processing a Bitcoin
transaction consumes an estimated 5,000 times as much energy as using a
credit card, and it is estimated that Bitcoin mining, which requires energyintensive server farms, consumes as much energy as was used by 159 of
the world’s nations.50 This is particularly important because
47

Id. (discussing the fiduciary duty of orders).

The analysis has become more sophisticated with some suggesting that smart contracts
can either outsource the legal assessment of ambiguities to an expert human oracle or
“deviate from the law by replacing the rule with a simpler hard-and-fast rule.” Eric Tjong
Tjin Tai, Force Majeure and Excuses in Smart Contracts 12 (Tilburg Private Law, Working
Paper No. 10, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3183637.
While this second approach makes implementation and satisfaction of contracts an
executable function, it merely “shift[s] the costs of contracting to the pre-contracting
stage, as everything has to be drafted in the contract” before contract execution. Id. at
17–18.
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49 Saeed Elnaj, The Problems With Bitcoin And The Future Of Blockchain, FORBES (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/03/29/the-problemswith-bitcoin-and-the-future-of-blockchain/#2488e90a68dc. Ethereum is another
prominent cryptocurrency that makes use of proof of work. Lucy Berry, Traditional
Cryptocurrency Mining is Harmful for Environment, HASHGAINS BLOG (Feb. 17, 2018),
https://www.hashgains.com/blog/traditional-cryptocurrency-mining-harmfulenvironment/#.

Bernard Marr, The 5 Big Problems With Blockchain Everyone Should Be Aware Of, FORBES
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/19/the-5-big-

50

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815967

2019]

A CYBER-SKEPTIC’S CONSERNS

923

cryptocurrency mining is expanding in countries like China, where 60%
of Bitcoin mining takes place and where server farms are often powered
by inefficient coal-fired plants.51 As the process for validating transactions
becomes more complicated, Bitcoin’s power demand is only likely to
increase, demanding as much electricity as the entire U.S. by 2019.52 This
is simply unacceptable, particularly given the availability of digital
currencies, such as Ether and Ripple, that are processed differently.53
Transparency
Before I conclude, I want to briefly issue a warning about the
“transparency” mantra that blockchain adherents chant to promote the
technology. What does transparency mean in this context? On a
blockchain, advocates repeatedly tell us, even although user identities are
cryptographically concealed, “explorer” browsers display the contents of
individual blocks and transactions, and transaction histories of public
anonymous addresses.54 This makes blockchain sound groundbreaking,
but, as one report notes, “[f[ew people understand what it is, but Wall
Street banks, IT organizations, and consultants are buzzing about
blockchain technology.”55 Unless you read and write sophisticated
programming languages such as C++, Java, Ruby, Simplicity, Python, and
Solidity,56 you are out of luck and will be wholly dependent upon coders
for translation.
As those who do international work are well aware, translations
are fraught with problems even when working with legal professionals
under the very best of circumstances. Attempting to explain sophisticated
contractual clauses to IT professionals who have not also had legal training
problems-with-blockchain-everyone-should-be-aware-of/#228a93ee1670.
DAVID REJESKI & LOVINIA REYNOLDS, BLOCKCHAIN SALVATION 3 (Envtl L. Inst.
Policy Brief, June 2018), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/policy-brief14-web.pdf.
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Id.

See Elnaj, supra note 49. “Ether, for example, uses the proof-of-stake concept, which is
energy efficient, while the cryptocurrency ripple does not require mining.” Id.
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Blockchain Transparency Explained, Lisk (2018), https://lisk.io/academy/
blockchain-basics/benefits-of-blockchain/blockchain-transparency-explained.
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Research Briefs, What Is Blockchain Technology?, CBInsights (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/what-is-blockchain-technology/.

55

Blockchain Coding: The Many different Languages You Need!, Blockgeeks,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/blockchain-coding/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
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in order to ensure accurate and precise autonomous execution certainly
does not qualify for my “best of circumstances.” One author predicts that
“[f]raudulent and unconscionable contract terms, traditionally policed by
courts, [will] likely proliferate as ‘code-savvy parties’ take advantage of the
‘code-naive.’”57 As with the predictions associated with AI, technologically
-adept lawyers will survive and thrive in a blockchain prolific future;
further segmentation vis-à-vis this technocratic class system may
marginalize others.
Conclusion
That wraps up my very quick overview of the approximately
219,000,000 results from Google, even though it did take longer than 0.39
seconds. I will conclude by noting that businesses, and business lawyers,
even those embracing new technologies, understand that complex
business situations involve concepts and relationships that can be captured
only imperfectly by heavily negotiated and carefully drafted contracts.
Transactions and operations often require the kind of flexibility
fundamentally at odds with algorithmically-constructed smart contracts,
which, by their very nature, must be unambiguous. For such situations,
the automatic execution of smart contracts is a software bug, not a feature.
Professor Weldon’s recommendation that “boards put blockchain
on their agendas to explore the impact the technology has on the business
. . . [g]iven the increasingly widespread use of the technology by both state
and nonstate actors and its potential disruptive capabilities for certain
industries, firms that do not explore blockchain’s impact risk obsolescence
or increased regulation.”58 At this point, however, I recommend that
corporate boards approach this technology cautiously, and it appears that
they are proceeding with care. In a 2018 survey of Corporate Information
Officers regarding blockchain adoption within their organizations, only
1% indicated any kind of organizational blockchain adoption; only 8%
were planning or considering experimenting with blockchain; and 77%
reported no interest in the technology and/or no action planned to
investigate or develop it.59 Corporations certainly are aware of and
interested in blockchain’s corporate governance, cybersecurity/data
protection, and environmental, social and governance disclosure potential,
Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and The Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 263, 302 (2017).
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See supra note 1.

Hype Killer—Only 1% of Companies Are Using Blockchain, Gartner Reports, Artificial
Lawyer (May 4, 2018), https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/05/04/hype-killer-only1-of-companies-are-using-blockchain-gartner-reports/.
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but they may, like most governments, be waiting for the technology to
mature as well as seeking to identify professionals to implement
blockchain technology, including technologically-proficient lawyers.
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